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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
TINA EILEEN ROBERTS 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20060749-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to the greatest 
minimum mandatory prison term for aggravated kidnapping when she actively participated 
in the brutal beating and killing of a vulnerable young woman, expressed no genuine 
remorse, and presented herself as entirely untrustworthy? 
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. State v. Valdavinos, 
1 
2003 UT App 432, ^  14, 82 P.3d 1167. "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails 
to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." Id. 
(additional quotation and citation omitted). 
STATUTES AND RULE 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2006); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (West 2004);1 
UTAH R.EVID. 201. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with aggravated kidnapping, murder, and obstruction of 
justice (Counts I-III). R5-6. In exchange for a dismissal of Counts two and three, defendant 
pled guilty to Count I. R101-02, 103-09; 154. The court sentenced defendant to a prison 
term of fifteen-years-to-life. R125-127; 155:19. Defendant timely appealed. R133. The 
Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. R147. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
A Shocking Discovery 
In early January 2006, two young men were riding four-wheelers on the Toquerville 
1
 Citation is to the version of the statutes applicable at the time of the offense and 
of sentencing. Both cited sections have since been amended. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-201 (West Supp. 2007) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2007) Statutory 
compilations. 
2
 Because there was no trial, the facts are drawn from the presentence investigation 
report (PSI). 
2 
Falls Road when they saw what they thought was a mannequin. PSI at 3. When they got a 
closer look, they were "shocked" to realize it was a girl's body. Id. She was "covered with 
blood," and appeared to have been shot in the head. Id. There were lacerations, abrasions, 
and contusions on her face and the extremities of her emaciated body. Id. at 4. One of the 
boys called his father, who was a Deputy with the Washington County Sheriffs Department. 
Id. at 3. Police determined that the girl was Trisha Stubbs, a witness in a St. George 
investigation regarding Jack Brown. Id. A few days earlier, on January 4, Trisha Stubbs was 
eagerly awaiting the arrival of her sister's baby. Id. at 4. Before going to the hospital, she 
told her family that she was going to stop at a gas station. Id. Trisha never made it to the 
hospital. 
Trisha Stubbs—A Vulnerable Victim 
Trisha had smoked marijuana in high school, but about eight months before she was 
murdered she had started using methamphetamine. PSI at 5. Jack Brown was a drug dealer. 
Id. Trisha got "very skinny hanging out with Jack," her sister reported. Id. Months later, 
she went to live with her sister to "try and clean up," after being released from jail for drug 
possession. Id. "[B]ut she would end up taking off with Jack Brown." Id. 
Defendant—Mistress of An Ambience of Depraved Social Deviance and Criminality 
Defendant grew up in Upland, California and still considered it to be her home. PSI 
3 
at 13. Upland is situated in an area known as the "Inland Empire."3 Defendant was involved 
with a white supremacist group called the "I.E. Skins"—the "Inland Empire Skins White 
Supremacist Movement/' a "hate" movement. Id. at 2, 10.4 In response to Adult Probation 
& Parole (AP&P) investigator's questioning, defendant denied any knowledge of this group 
and asserted that she had never been involved with it and that any claim that she was 
associated with it was "ridiculous." Id. However, when pressed, she admitted that she 
collected "World War II memorabilia," such as swastikas and iron crosses. Id. She also had 
a "pagan" tattoo on her leg, consistent with the white supremacist culture. Id. When her 
home was searched, pictures were found showing various persons, including defendant's 
fifteen-year-old daughter, Brittney, and her five-year-old son, Corbin, posing in front of the 
Nazi flag which displayed a swastika and an iron cross while they performed the "Seig Heil 
3
 This Court may take judicial notice that Upland is in an area known as the 
Inland Empire. See Utah R. Evid. 201 ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."). See website, "Inland 
Empire Living": http://inlandempireliving.com. 
4
 This Court may also take judicial notice that a white supremacy group is a "hate" 
group. See e.g., West v. Derby Unified School Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th 
Cir.) (identifying "White Supremacy" and "Neo-Nazi" groups, among others, as "hate" 
groups), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000); cf Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 360 
(2003) ("[A] burning cross is a "symbol of hate," and a "a symbol of white supremacy.") 
(citation omitted). See also Intelligence Report—California Conflict, Souther Poverty 
Law Center at http://www.splcenter>org/intel/intelreport/article.isp?aid::::::572 , at 2 
("During that period [1990 to 2000], as hate crimes dropped 10% statewide in California, 
the number of reported hate crimes in the Inland Empire shot up 20%. Last year [2004], 
there were 148 hate crimes reported in the Inland Empire, most of them committed by 
racist Skinheads and other white supremacists.") (Addendum B). 
4 
German/Hitler salute." R29; PSI at 7. Police also seized three firearms. PSI at 7. 
Defendant claimed that she was bringing young, drug-addicted boys into her home "to 
help them get clean." Id. at 2. In fact, she was "recruiting" this small group in the St. George 
area for the white supremacist movement and "encouraging criminal activity among [the 
boys]." Id. at 10. 
Defendant was also aware that Brittney was sleeping with Eric Chavis, a twenty-
eight-year-old married man, in defendant's home. PSI at 8.5 
Defendant denied that she had a drug problem. PSI at 2. However, she acknowledged 
that she began using methamphetamine at the age of twenty-one, and witnesses reported that 
she was using methamphetamine "quite extensively" before the offense and regularly 
thereafter. PSI at 2, 10, 15. And although defendant claimed to be helping boys and her 
daughter to overcome their drug addictions, the AP&P investigator opined that defendant's 
friends and associates "all appear to be involved in the drug culture and/or crime element." 
Id. at 2, 10. After the offense and while in Las Vegas, defendant injected Brittney "with 
something in a syringe" while "several men held her down." Id. at 8. 
At the time of the offense, defendant, then thirty-four -years old, was living with her 
third husband, Michael Stedt. PSI at 13-14. Defendant claimed that her marriage was 
wonderful and happy and that she never had sexual relations with Jack Brown. Id. at 15. 
5
 Chavis was among the persons giving the Nazi salute in the photographs seized 
from defendant's home. PSI at 7. 
5 
The AP&P investigator, however, opined that defendant was "infatuated" with Brown and 
that she admitted that once before she "'blew him' in the car on the way to Las Vegas." Id. 
Brittney told detectives that her home life was "crazy," and that there were people at the 
house all the time. Id, at 8. Defendant claimed to be a great mother, even though she 
exposed her children to drug dealers and white supremacists in and out of her home. Id. at 
10. 
Killing a Snitch 
Trisha had recently spoken with police about forgeries and thefts involving herself 
and Brown. PSI at 3, 5. On January 4, the day she disappeared, Trisha called defendant and 
told her that some detectives had been to see her about the offenses. Id, at 5. Although she 
feared that Brown might kill her, she nevertheless asked to speak with him. Id, at 5, 7. At 
some point that day, Brown arranged to meet with Trisha. Id, at 5. 
At about 8:00 p.m. that night, defendant gave Brown a ride to pick up a Honda 
Prelude that he and Kyle Jensen had reportedly stolen the night before. Id. at 4-5.6 Later, 
Brown called defendant and asked her to open her garage and clear space for him to park 
the car inside. Id. When he arrived, Trisha was with him. Id. at 5. He took her into 
defendant's kitchen and began questioning her about what she had told police. Id. During 
the questioning, Brown became irate, "yelling at Trisha" and telling her that she was a "rat." 
6
 Jensen was among the subjects depicted giving the Nazi salute in the photographs 
seized from defendant's home. PSI at 7. 
6 
Id. Defendant encouraged her fifteen-year-old daughter, Brittney, to assault Trisha, and 
defendant, Brittney, and Brown hit and kicked Trisha repeatedly as she huddled on the floor. 
Id. At one point, Brown brandished a knife and threatened to stab Trisha. Id. Defendant and 
Brown "were in control and seemed to be running things." Id. 
The three assailants then wrapped duct tape around Trisha's wrists, ankles, and mouth, 
and put her in defendant's car. Id. at 5-6. Brown, with defendant and Jensen, drove to the 
Toquerville Falls Road, commenting on the way that he would "kill[] snitches." Id. at 6. 
Defendant interjected, "If you don't do it, I'm going to have to." Id. Upon arriving, Brown 
stopped the car, dragged Trisha out of the back seat, and fired multiple shots into her head 
with a double action .357 revolver. Id. at 4, 6. It was reported that defendant had given 
Brown the gun several days before the killing. Id. at 6. The gun, which was never recovered, 
was reportedly taken to defendant's brother's motorcycle shop to be melted down. Id. at 5.7 
Defendant called Brittney and directed her to clean up Trisha's blood in the kitchen, 
where they had beaten her. PSI at 6, 7. Brittney mopped up the blood, as instructed, with 
her little brother's assistance. Id. 6 ,7, 8, 11. 
Upon returning home, defendant gathered up her children and fled in her car with 
them, Brown, and Jensen, first to Las Vegas and then to Hesperia, California, leaving her 
7
 While hedging about her own involvement, defendant admitted that her brother 
"might have been involved" with the Inland Empire Skins. PSI at 10. 
7 
husband, Michael, behind.8 R29; PSI at 5, 6. Brown was arrested on three outstanding 
warrants. R29; PSI at 7. Defendant, her children, and Jensen were detained and agreed to 
return to Utah. PSI at 7. Upon her return, Brittney told a Child Protective Services (CPS) 
worker that she was friends with the victim and never wanted to hit her, but that defendant 
"made her hit Trisha." Id. at 7. According to Brittney, defendant also told her to falsely 
accuse her stepfather, Michael, of sexually abusing her. Id. During a custody hearing, 
defendant told the same CPS worker to tell Brittney, "[I] did it for the wood," an expression 
defendant said Brittney would understand.9 Id. 
Defendant's version 
In a signed statement, defendant admitted hitting the victim "once[,] at most twice," 
but claimed to be "scared" of Brown and that she participated that night "out of fear." Id. at 
9. She claimed to think that Brown was going to take Trisha to a friend's house when he 
drove to Toquerville Falls Road to kill her. Id. She also claimed that during the process she 
"wanted it to stop [and] it didn't." Id. "I was terrified," she claimed. Id. 
8
 Defendant stated that she hated living in Utah and wanted to return to her home 
in California "as soon as possible." PSI at 14. Hesperia, California is a town in the 
Inland Empire. See website, "Inland Empire Living," supra n. 4. 
9
 According to the AP&P investigator, "peckerwood" is a term that refers both to 
white youths with loose ties to white power gangs in and out of prison, as well as to 
actual skinhead gangs who have incorporated "peckerwood" into their name. PSI at 10. 
The peckerwood gangs are involved in the methamphetamine trade and have ties to other 
white supremacist gangs. Id. Peckerwood gang members have been charged with a 
variety of crimes ranging from drug dealing to attempted murder. Id. A peckerwood, or 
"wood," is a white prison inmate who is willing to fight to avoid being raped or robbed. 
Id. White inmates have appropriated the term and made it a source of pride. Id. 
8 
The Sentencing 
At sentencing, the court heard from the victim's father, the prosecutor, defense 
counsel, and defendant. Rl55:3-17. The court also "read a very well[-]prepared and very 
thorough and complete pre-sentence report [PSI]." R155:18. The PSI contained an 
assessment of defendant, her history and circumstances; a detailed description of the offense 
taken from police investigations; statements from defendant and an investigator relating to 
the offense; defendant's criminal history; victim impact statements from the victim's sister 
and father; relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances forms; and two letters, one 
from defendant's mother and the other from an investigating officer.10 PSIat 2-15, Form 4. 
The permissible statutory prison terms for aggravated kidnapping are six-, ten-, or 
fifteen-years-to-life. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302(3) (West 2004). The prosecutor argued 
that the sentencing court should impose the maximum penalty, given that defendant failed 
to take responsibility, minimized her involvement, and was involved in gang activity in the 
commission of the offense; part of the conduct took place in defendant's home; defendant 
not only assaulted the victim herself, but also instructed her young daughter to strike the 
victim; and because the victim was killed for being a witness, which undermined the justice 
system. Rl55:14-17. The PSI contained three aggravating circumstances: the victim was 
particularly vulnerable, the injury to the victim was unusually extensive, and the offense was 
10
 These letters are not numbered with the rest of the report, but are included at the 
end of it. Also, the envelope containing the PSI is unnumbered. 
9 
characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. PSI at Form 4. 
Defense counsel argued for a lesser penalty given that defendant, with one exception 
involving petty theft, had never been in the criminal justice system; defendant posed a 
moderate risk to re-offend; defendant was a mother; the crime was not a hate crime; the 
crime began without defendant's knowledge; defendant's involvement was not extensive and 
her relationship to the killers was not close; defendant admitted wrongdoing and 
demonstrated remorse; defendant was amenable to supervision; defendant had good family 
relationships; and a more severe penalty would work extensive hardship on the family. 
Rl 55:5-12. Defendant also personally apologized in court. R155:13. The PSI contained one 
mitigating circumstance: an extended period of arrest-free street time. PSI at Form 4. 
The court disagreed with defendant that her involvement was somehow accidental or 
minimal. It found that defendant's behavior showed "evil intent at every step," eventually 
resulting in a young woman's death. Rl 5 5:18. It also found that defendant "orchestrated the 
circumstances" of the crime, provided a location for the victim's beating to take place, and 
encouraged the beating. Id. It noted that Trisha Stubbs was trying to leave behind her 
criminal conduct and that defendant "took part in and assisted in every step of the 
proceedings to stop [Trisha] on her journey back into the light." Id. Finally, the court 
forcefully rebuked defendant for standing in the way of truth and civilized society through 
her brutal actions. R155:19. The court then found that "[t]he aggravating circumstances in 
this case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances," imposed the greatest minimum 
10 
mandatory prison sentence of fifteen-years-to-life "[b]ecause of the assault upon the justice 
system here," and issued its "strongest recommendation to the Utah Board of Pardons that 
[defendant] never see the light of day outside of prison again." R125-127; 155:19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the greatest 
minimum mandatory prison term for aggravated kidnapping. The court read and considered 
an unusually thorough PSI, in which the AP&P investigator described in detail defendant's 
involvement in and commitment to a white supremacist hate group, her perverse home life, 
her active participation in the offense, her patent untrustworthiness in refusing to 
acknowledge the true character of her life, and her evident lack of remorse for the victim. 
Having read the PSI, the trial court implicitly identified all of the relevant mitigating and 
aggravating factors. The PSI set out three aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. 
Review of the PSI fully supports that enumeration. The trial court relied on the PSI, holding 
factors in aggravation far outweighed those in mitigation. There was no abuse of discretion 
in sentencing defendant to a prison term of fifteen-years-to-life. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT TO THE GREATEST MINIMUM MANDATORY PRISON TERM 
FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, WHERE SHE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED 
IN THE BRUTAL BEATING AND KILLING OF A VULNERABLE YOUNG 
WOMAN, EXPRESSED NO GENUINE REMORSE, AND PRESENTED HERSELF 
AS ENTIRELY UNTRUSTWORTHY 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to identify and then properly weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors. Aplt. Br. at 7-11. In fact, he argues, the mitigating 
factors outweighed the aggravating factors. Aplt. Br. at 11. Thus, he concludes, the court 
abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to the greatest minimum mandatory term of 
fifteen-years-to-life, instead of to the least or middle terms of six- or ten-years-to-life. Id. 
The claim fails in each of its particulars because it is not only unsupported by the record, but 
also because it is fully and particularly contravened by it. 
A. The operative standards on review and at sentencing. 
Trial courts have wide latitude in sentencing decisions. "A sentence will not be 
overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State 
v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,125, 52 P.3d 451 (quoting State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 
(Utah App. 1993).11 '"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the 
11
 Defendant does not claim that the sentence fell outside legally prescribed limits, 
as the fifteen-years-to-life term imposed on defendant is provided for by statute. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302(3) (West 2004) ("Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 
12 
personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can 
be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Nuttall, 
861 P.2d at 456 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978)). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping. RIO 1-02. Conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping requires the imposition of one of three minimum mandatory 
sentences: six-, ten-, or fifteen-years-to-life. Supra n.ll . "If a statute under which the 
defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, 
the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime " UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-20 l(7)(a) (West 
Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court imposed the greatest minimum term of fifteen-years-to-life. 
Rl 27. "In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest 
or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, 
. . . and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-201(7)(c) (West Supp. 2006). When "the record indicates that the trial court considered" 
these factors and finds that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators, "the fact that [defendant] 
views [the] situation differently . . . does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider" 
them. State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, \ 17, 158 P.3d 1128 (alterations in original; 
years and which may be for life."). 
13 
additional quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tf 14,40 P.3d 626). 
B. The trial court properly identified and weighed all the relevant factors. 
Defendant claims error in that "the trial court failed to identify the relevant mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances [on] which he based his [sentencing] decision," and that "the 
factors in mitigation clearly outnumber those in aggravation . . . or at the very least,... are 
equal." Aplt. Br. at 11. The record and the law refute both claims. 
The trial court here clearly identified the bases for its sentencing decision. As stated 
above, the court disagreed with defendant that her involvement was somehow accidental or 
minimal. It found that defendant's behavior showed "evil intent at every step," eventually 
resulting in a young woman's death. Rl 5 5:18. It also found that defendant "orchestrated the 
circumstances" of the crime, provided a location for the victim's beating to take place, and 
encouraged the beating. Id. It noted that Trisha Stubbs was trying to leave behind her 
criminal conduct and that defendant "took part in and assisted in every step of the 
proceedings to stop [Trisha] on her journey back into the light." Id. Finally, the court 
forcefully stated: 
Your actions strike at the very core of the purpose for this Court, which is to find 
truth. Trisha Stubbs was the carrier of truth. She gave truth to the officer that she 
spoke with, but you and your involvement... attempted to hide and destroy that truth 
from this courtroom where it needs to be shouted loud, for without truth[,] our society 
and our civilization will not stand. We will instead fall into brutal chaos, and you[r] 
actions stand only for that chaos. 
R155:19. The court then found that "[t]he aggravating circumstances in this case far 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances," and imposed the greatest minimum mandatory 
14 
prison sentence of fifteen-years-to-life "[bjecause of the assault upon the justice system 
here." Rl 55:19. the trial court then issued its "strongest recommendation to the Utah Board 
of Pardons that [defendant] never see the light of day outside of prison again." See 
Transcript of Sentencing, R15 5:19 (Addendum C). See also Judgment, Restitution Judgment, 
Sentence, and Commitment; R125-128, at 128 (Addendum D). 
The trial court did not list any mitigating factors, because no such enumeration was 
required in this case. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2004), the trial court was 
only required to "set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper . .. term," and to consider the mitigating factors. See section § 76-3-20l(7)(c)-(d). 
It is clear that the trial court considered all of the proffered mitigating circumstances. It read 
and considered "a very well [-jprepared and very thorough and complete pre-sentence report," 
as well as listened to defendant's proffered mitigators at sentencing. R. 155:5-13, 18. 
Defendant cannot claim that "the trial court did not consider the[se] factors at all, simply 
because it did not address each of the[m] [] on the record." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f^ 
10, 40 P.3d 626. Indeed, when a trial court states that it has examined the PSI, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that is sufficient evidence in the record "to suggest that the trial 
court did consider all the [necessary] factors." Id. at \ 13. 
While it is true that "[t]he trial court is charged with identifying, on the record, the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision," State v. 
Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ^ 10, 113 P.3d 992, "[i]n the absence of any express findings 
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regarding proffered mitigating or aggravating circumstances, [this Court] conclude[s] that 
the trial court, by implication found that the proffered circumstances did not amount to 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation." Id. at 118. When the trial court here did not 
accept defendant's "proffered [mitigating] circumstances" by failing to include them in the 
sentencing determination, it found "by implication" that they were not mitigators. Id, 
This Court's analysis in Moreno is instructive. Moreno was convicted of sodomy on 
a child. There, as here, the trial court was required to undertake a weighing of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances to determine the sentence under statute. Moreno, 2005 UT App 
200, ^ 9. When sentenced to the maximum term, Moreno appealed, claiming that the trial 
court had abused its discretion by "ignoring powerful relevant mitigating evidence that 
outweighed any aggravating factors." Id. at ^ 8 (additional quotation marks omitted). Like 
defendant here, Moreno was listed in his PSI as a "moderate" risk to reoffend. Id. at ^ f 6, PSI 
at 2. Also like defendant here, Moreno argued that he was remorseful, but the investigators 
concluded that he tended to "blame others for his conduct." Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, J^ 
15. As the trial court in Moreno, the court here was faced with "two competing views," one 
where defendant was a reluctant, frightened, and minimal participant, as argued by 
defendant, and one where defendant was a willing, calculating orchestrator, as argued by the 
prosecutor and investigators. The trial court's findings show that it believed the PSI 
investigators and the prosecutor, and thus found, at least inferentially, that defendant's 
proffered mitigators were not mitigators at all. Id. at [^ 18. Defendant has done little more 
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in her brief than argue by implication that "the trial court could not have considered all the 
factors and then ordered as it did. However, the fact that [she] views the situation differently 
than did the trial court," Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  14, does not mean that the trial court acted 
improperly. 
C. The PSI supports the trial court's assessment of the relevant factors. 
In fact, the PSI, on which the court explicitly relied, fully rebuts defendant's claim that 
the court failed to acknowledge and then weigh her proposed mitigating factors. In truth, 
there were no mitigating factors to speak of. 
Minimal criminal history. Defendant argues that she had only one previous 
conviction, for petty theft. Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing PSI at 11). 
Defendant's limited conviction record pales alongside all of her ancillary criminal 
activity, for which she had not yet been convicted. She reportedly was using 
methamphetamine regularly (PSI at 2, 10, 15); she was both neglecting the welfare of her 
fifteen-year-old daughter and contributing to her delinquency by allowing her to sleep with 
a twenty-eight year old married man (PSI at 8); she was evidently an accomplice to crime by 
encouraging boys to commit crimes as part of their recruitment into a white supremacy 
movement (PSI at 10); and she assisted Brown in hiding a stolen vehicle. PSI at 4-5. 
Involvement in the offense to lesser extent and only out of fear. Defendant argues 
that she was less involved in Trisha's murder than Brown, and that she only acted out of fear 
of Brown. Aplt. Br. at 9-10 (citing PSI at 6-10). 
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Brown was unquestionably the principal player, but the record belies that defendant 
played only a trivial role or acted out of fear. The record strongly indicates that defendant 
arranged for Brown to pick Trisha up and to bring her to defendant's home. PSI at 5. 
Defendant ordered her daughter to strike the first blow and thereafter aided and encouraged 
the assault. Id. According to a witness, defendant and Brown "were in control and seemed 
to be running things." Id. When Brown said that he might kill Trisha because she was a 
snitch, defendant announced, "If you don't do it, I'm going to have to." Id. at 6. Defendant 
directed the mopping up of Trisha's blood. Id. at 6,7. Defendant reportedly provided Brown 
with the murder weapon several days before the killing, and her brother, reportedly, would 
provide the means of disposing of it. Id. at 5, 6. When Kyle Jensen acknowledged that he 
had told the police "everything," defendant "just stared at him" and called him "Rat!" Id. at 
8. Well after the incident, defendant admitted the intensity of her involvement in Trisha's 
murder when she said, "I did it for the wood." Id. at 7. 
When defendant finally spoke with the AP&P investigator, she "minimized her 
involvement to the point that she felt she did nothing of her own will whatsoever." PSI at 
9-10. Defendant's attempts to diminish her role, however, fell before her patent 
untrustworthiness. The PSI investigator opined that defendant's statements had been 
"inconsistent throughout the whole investigation, including her PSI interview." PSI at 10. 
"It is my opinion," she wrote, "that Mrs. Roberts has been so untruthful that not even she is 
sure of what the truth is anymore." Id. The discrepancies between defendant's reports about 
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her drug use, her home life, her marriage, and her involvement with the white supremacy 
movement, on the one hand, and the realities of her circumstances, on the other hand, give 
weight to the investigator's opinions. Based on the facts and her impression of defendant, 
the investigator stated that she believed defendant knew "very well" what was going to 
happen to the victim and "instigated and motivated Jack Brown every step of the way." Id. 
at 11. 
Amenable to supervision and Remorseful. Defendant claims that she is "amenable 
to supervision" and is "remorseful for her participation." Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing PSI at 10, 
12). 
The State is unable to find any statement in the PSI indicating that defendant is 
amenable to supervision. Rather, her intransigence with the AP&P investigator suggests 
precisely the opposite. And as to her post hoc change of attitude, it is doubtful. The AP&P 
investigator noted that defendant "went into detail about how much she ha[d] suffered 
through this whole thing" and that she barely even knew Trisha, because she doesn't deal 
with 'girlies.'" PSI at 10. The investigator also found it "of great concern" that defendant 
would subject her children to such "a terrible home environment, replete with drug dealers 
and White Supremacist gang members." Id. at 10. She found it "horrific" that defendant 
gave orders to Brittney to participate in the beating and the clean-up of Trisha's blood. Id. 
at 11. Accordingly, she recommended that defendant "serve the maximum amount of time 
in prison that can be ordered." Id. 
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Lieutenant Adams, who had been working on the investigation and was present at a 
few of defendant's interviews, corroborated the AP&P investigator's evaluation. In a letter 
attached to the PSI, he asserted that in at least one interview defendant referred to the victim 
derogatorily, as though she were insignificant. In that same interview, defendant did not 
acknowledge her involvement in the crime and thereafter constantly made justifications for 
any wrongdoing. Lt. Adams "personally believe[d] that [defendant] is not sorry that Trisha 
was killed, but only sorry that she was arrested. This makes me believe that, given the 
opportunity, [defendant] would commit this crime again to further her own selfish interests." 
Based on this record, the trial court's failure to specifically identify any mitigating 
factors is justified—there were no such factors. Balanced against this absence of mitigating 
factors were at least three specifically identified aggravating factors in the PSI: (1) the 
victim was particularly vulnerable; (2) injury to person was unusually extensive; and (3) the 
offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. Defendant does not dispute the 
validity of these aggravators. Aplt. Br. at 7. Rather, she asserts that "the factors in 
mitigation clearly outnumber those in aggravation, or at the very least, they are equal. Aplt. 
Br. at 11. As set out above, that is not the case. 
In sum, the trial court correctly identified all the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
factors by considering a thorough and carefully drawn PSI and, based on a reasonable 
weighing of those factors, did not abuse its discretion in ordering that defendant serve the 
greatest minimum mandatory term for the offense she committed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
sentence be affirmed. 
* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "M day of September, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UT ST §76-3-201 
U.C.A. '1953 § 76-3-201 (WEST 2004) 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— 
Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise 
harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition 
or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
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(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if 
the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the 
state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to 
appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
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(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution 
for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of 
incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional 
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation 
costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the 
negotiated reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable 
accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as 
defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for 
the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered 
restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria 
provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
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(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
7 6-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant 
paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of 
the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or 
mitigation of the crime, except as provided in Subsection (8). 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement 
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional 
facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and 
served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set for 
sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of 
the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the 
probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under 
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the 
prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for 
imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
(8)(a) The defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in prison if 
the trier of fact finds that: 
(i) during the commission of any of the following offenses the defendant causes 
substantial bodily injury to the child: 
(A) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping; 
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
(C) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; or 
(D) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; or 
(ii) at the time of the commission of any of the offenses in Subsections 
(8)(a)(i)(A) through (D), the defendant had been previously convicted of: 
(A) Section 76-5-402, rape; 
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
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(c 
(D 
(E 
(F 
(G 
(H 
of 
(I 
(J 
or 
(K 
Section 76-5-402.2, object rape; 
Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; 
Subsection 76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy; 
Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; 
Section 76-5-404, forcible sexual abuse; 
Section 76-5-404.1, sexual abuse of a child and aggravated sexual abuse 
a child; 
Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
any offense in any other state or federal jurisdiction which constitutes 
would constitute a crime in Subsections (8)(a)(ii)(A) through (I); or 
the attempt to commit any of the offenses in Subsections (8) (a) (ii) (A) 
through (J). 
(b) This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; 
Laws 1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, 
c. 156, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, 
§ 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st 
Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 1, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, 
eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 
270, § 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 
2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2006, c. 208, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006. 
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UT ST § 76-5-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-302 (WEST SUPP. 2006) 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 3. KIDNAPPING 
§ 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, 
Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for 
life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15; 
Laws 1995, c. 337, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 5, 
eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 
69, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Westlaw 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
*• Article II. Judicial Notice 
-RULE 201. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS 
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied 
with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be 
heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the 
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing Jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury 
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Addendum B 
Southern Poverty Law Center 
intelligence Report 
California Conflict 
As minorities move into the region known as the Inland Empire, white supremacists unleash a 
hate crime backlash. 
By David Holthouse 
CHINO HILLS, Calif. — Despite all their big talk of honor, pride and the Aryan warrior's code, neo-Nazi Skinheads 
don't like a fair fight. Cowards by nature, they prefer to travel in packs and gang up on hate crime victims. The trio 
of Nazi skins laying in wait near a playground in a park here the morning of May 1 proved no different. 
Around 11 a.m. that Sunday, a 21-year-old black man from the nearby city of Diamond Bar arrived at the park with 
a group of foster children from a group home where the man volunteered as an activities coordinator. He'd brought 
the kids to play basketball. As the players divided into teams, according to witnesses and police reports, the 
Skinheads swaggered over. They called the foster home worker a "nigger." They told him he'd made a big mistake 
by showing up in their park that morning with a bunch of mongrel brats. 
The subject of their taunts and threats hastily tried to gather his charges to leave, but the Skinheads surrounded 
him and then attacked. They thought the odds were three to one. But they were wrong. Several of the kids jumped 
into the fray. Seconds later, two more adult employees of the group home arrived in a separate vehicle and heard 
the intended victim yelling for help. They also joined the combat. The Skinheads suddenly found themselves badly 
outnumbered in a fight they'd started. 
One of them ran for their car, jumped in, gunned the engine, and promptly crashed into a park bench, then a metal 
exercise station, then a concrete barrier, and then, at last, a tree. Unfortunately, the damage did not disable the 
vehicle, and the Nazi at the wheel was able to throw it in reverse then roar across a field and toward the cluster of 
kids and adults from the group home, who by then had beaten one of the remaining Skinheads to the ground and 
were physically restraining the other while they waited for the police to arrive (several bystanders had called 911 on 
mobile phones). 
The first officers on the scene found the enraged driver of the battered car wheeling erratically around the park, 
chasing the kids and group home workers in a deadly game of tag. They immediately blocked his vehicle with their 
own and arrested him for attempted murder. The other two Skinheads were taken into custody on charges of 
aggravated assault (one of them escaped from a local hospital that night after being treated for his injuries). A 
spokesman for the Chino Hills Sheriffs Department described the 20-year-old Skinhead driver as "a known white 
supremacist" who had previously been arrested for several racially motivated attacks in San Bernardino County. "He 
places himself in places where minorities will be and makes slurs," the spokesman said. Police found neo-Nazi 
pamphlets, stickers, and patches inside his car. 
The attack In Chino Hills, a suburban city with about 70,000 residents, was no isolated incident. I t occurred in the 
heart of the Inland Empire, a booming region of Southern California where tract homes are cheap, the air is filthy, 
and white power violence is on the rise. 
The New Minority 
Made up of an area stretching from western Riverside County to the southwest corner of San Bernardino County, 
the Inland Empire used to be a sparsely populated, rural area of ranches, vineyards and farms, where whites were 
the clear and dominant majority. 
All that has changed. 
Driven from Los Angeles and San Diego by soaring housing prices, middle- and working-class black, Hispanic and 
Asian families have migrated to the Inland Empire in massive numbers, drawn by a surplus of comparatively 
affordable, big homes in sprawling, suburban-style developments. The rolling, high-desert terrain of the Inland 
Empire is now studded with more than 50 small to mid-sized cities containing a combined population of roughly 3 
million. This continuing exodus inland from Southern California's expensive coastal cities has fueled large-scale 
residential, commercial and industrial development in the region. Horse pastures and orange groves have been 
paved over for strip malls and chain restaurants. Simultaneously, the Inland Empire has experienced rapid 
demographic shifts as more and more minorities move into a region that has long been a hotbed of white 
supremacist activity Between 1990 and 2000, the Inland Empire's white population increased only 7%, while the 
number of blacks grew 6 1 % , Asians 62% and Latinos 82%. 
Whites are now a minority in the Inland Empire. 
These seismic changes in the region's racial make-up have corresponded with a steady rise in hate crimes, including 
a particularly vicious spike in racially motivated violence and harassment in the past two years. During that period, 
as hate crimes dropped 10% statewide in California, the number of reported hate crimes in the Inland Empire shot 
up 20% Last year, there were 148 hate crimes reported in the Inland Empire, most of them committed by racist 
Skinheads and other white supremacists. 
This year, this disturbing trend has shown no signs of abating. 
In January, in just one example, a gang of 10 neo-Nazi Skinheads attacked three Hispanic men outside a topless 
bar in Redlands, yelling racial slurs while they knocked the men to the ground then kicked them mercilessly. One of 
the victims suffered a broken arm. All three were hospitalized. 
"The unfortunate reality is that the Inland Empire is California's own northern Idaho," said John Ruiz, assistant 
Riverside County district attorney, who has successfully prosecuted several high-profile hate crimes, including one 
in 2002 when he sent five members of the neo-Nazi Western Hammerskms to prison for stomping a black man with 
combat boots and cutting him with razor blades. With that case, Ruiz basically ran the Hammerskms out of town. 
The gang subsequently moved its base of operations to Mesa, Ariz. 
"A lot of people are moving out here, and some of them don't like rubbing elbows with ethnic minorities," Ruiz said. 
"It's a small but very vocal segment of our society." 
And, too often, a very violent one. 
Cow Hands Wanted 
The brochure reads, "Welcome to the City of Lake Elsmore, among the fastest growing cities in Riverside County. 
Picturesque mountains, Southern California's largest natural lake and a strategic location along the booming 1-15 
corridor make Lake Elsmore unique. Value for industrial expansion and new businesses are cornerstones of our 
economic gardening strategy. Discover what over 38,045 residents already know — Lake Elsmore's got more1" 
Lake Elsmore's also got neo-Nazis. 
In September 2003, three students were suspended from Lake Elsmore High School for hoisting a swastika banner 
up the school's flagpole during a patriotic assembly to commemorate the second anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks One of the students told a local newspaper, "I don't like black people." 
And last June, on the second-to-last day of school, two Nazi Skinheads — who were not students at Lake Elsmore 
High — accosted two black male students who were walking across the school's parking lot with a white female 
friend who was also a student. One of the Skinheads pulled up his shorts to display tattoos on his legs of a swastika 
and an Iron Cross. When the targets of his scorn just kept walking, the Skinhead drew an ice pick, ran after them, 
and stabbed one of the males repeatedly while shouting, "Die, nigger'" The second Skinhead threatened the other 
two students with a claw hammer when they tried to come to their wounded friend's aid. The stabbing victim, a 
starting linebacker on the school's football team, was seriously injured but survived. 
The Skinhead who wielded the ice pick, 19-year-old Armando Perez, appears Hispanic but insisted to police that he 
was white. He later pleaded guilty to aggravated felony hate crime assault When the judge asked him if his crime 
was motivated by racial hatred, Perez replied, "It definitely was." 
The Lake Elsmore assault took place 10 months after a comparable hate crime at a high school in Munetta Valley, a 
similarly sized, practically identical city that's just a short drive south on Interstate 15. In that case, a black 
basketball player at Munetta Valley High School was violently fouled by a white opponent in a game during which 
white fans yelled racial slurs from the stands. The next day, two white students attacked the ball player outside the 
high school principal's office, severely beating him while yelling more racial slurs. The attackers, then aged 14 and 
17, pleaded guilty to assault and making racial threats, and served short sentences in a juvenile detention center. 
At many Inland Empire high schools, racial conflicts arise when large numbers of incoming black and Hispanic 
students accustomed to urban environments undergo a clash of cultures with their new white classmates in semi-
rural locales like Norco, a city of about 24,000 located 50 miles southeast of Los Angeles that still calls itself "Horse 
Town usa." Norco's official Web site plays "Ghost Riders in the Sky" as theme music, greets visitors with "Howdy, 
Partner'" and proclaims, "We are dedicated to providing a high quality of life while keeping our rural lifestyle." City 
jobs are listed under the header, "Cow Hands Wanted." 
At Norco High School, two black female students who sat for lunch at a table in the shade that a group of white 
students told them was designated "Whites Only" last September were hit in the face with burntos and then 
punched in the face by two white males. A few days later, a group of white students beat another black student 
unconscious. Racist graffiti appeared on the school's walls. Yet another black student found song lyrics about 
shooting blacks placed on her desk. 
"People of color move their families out here because they can get a house for the price of an apartment in the big 
cities on the coast, and because they think it's safer out here than the neighborhoods they can afford there. But a 
lot of times they get here and they find a different kind of danger, a different kind of tension," said Lorraine Watts, 
president of the NAACP in Lake Elsmore. "Truth is, they have second thoughts once they're here, and if they could 
afford housing elsewhere, a lot of them would leave." 
'Forced Integration1 
From his home in Fallbrook, just south of the Inland Empire, notorious racist Tom Metzger has a front row seat to 
the rising racial hatred in his part of the world. 
He likes what he sees. 
"The chemistry out here is perfect for more and more racism," said Metzger, the leader of the white supremacist 
hate group White Aryan Resistance. "You've got all these non-whites moving here from Orange County and Los 
Angeles, trying to flee the crime perpetrated on them by their own kind in their ghettos, and when they come out 
here they're basically shoving forced integration down the throats of the whites who have traditional claim to this 
area, and that is provoking a negative racist reaction among whites, as it damn well should. It's great1" 
Most locals don't share Metzger's enthusiasm. 
Several Inland Empire school districts have formed diversity coalitions in hopes of curbing racial tension among 
students. Anti-racism community meetings in the Riverside County city of Hemet have drawn as many as 400 
people, and last November more than 7,000 residents in Lake Elsmore — nearly a fifth of the city's population — 
marched down the city's main street to protest against racial violence in their community. 
Not all such violence in Lake Elsmore or elsewhere in the Inland Empire is committed by whites. In 2003, four 
racially motivated fights between blacks and Hispanics broke out on campus at Hemet High School, resulting in 
mass suspensions, and last May, shouted racial slurs between black and Hispanic students at Temescal Canyon High 
School in Lake Elsmore escalated into a brawl involving 200 students. And this May, three Hispanic youths chased 
down a 15-year-old high school freshman and stabbed him to death outside his home in Corona in what prosecutors 
have termed a racially motivated homicide. The three made racially derogatory statements while their victim lay 
dying. 
But by far most of the hate crimes in the Inland Empire are white-on-black or white-on-Hispanic. The most recently 
reported of these crimes occurred July 10, when four Skinheads with "White Power" tattoos and swastika patches 
repeatedly drove past a Hispanic family's home in Hemet, shouting slurs and threats while brandishing knives. After 
the family called for help, police officers tracked down the Skinheads and arrested them for making terrorist threats 
with a hate crime enhancement. According to an investigative report, the Skinheads denied being members of any 
organized white power gang. They told the officers they were "just proud about being members of the Aryan race." 
Public Enemies 
In November 2003, the fbi formed a task force with the Riverside and San Bernardino County sheriff's departments 
that was designed to crack down on neo-Nazi Skinhead and other white power gangs in the Inland Empire, including 
the High Desert Freak Boys and the Angry Nazi Soldiers. 
Since then, the task force has arrested more than 60 individuals associated with white power hate groups on 
charges including illegal weapons possession, drug dealing, and hate crime violence. The task force has also seized 
more than 15,000 rounds of ammunition; more than 75 firearms, many of which had been illegally converted to 
fully automatic; a half-dozen stolen cars; bulletproof vests; a pharmacopeia of methamphetamme, hallucinogenic 
mushrooms, steroids and marijuana; and enough swastika flags, Hitler youth banners, knock-off SS daggers, WWII 
German army helmets, and white supremacist propaganda to fill a Dumpster. 
"Sixty years after the discovery of Auschwitz, I'm amazed we're still fighting this garbage in our country," said San 
Bernardino County Sheriff's Department spokesman Tom Freeman. 
Last November, one of 19 alleged white supremacists arrested on drugs and firearms charges was an assistant 
football coach at Paloma Valley High School in Menifee, which is near Hemet. According to investigators, the coach 
had supplied players with steroids and had recruited several of them, along with other Menifee and Hemet 
teenagers, to join a heavily armed white supremacist group affiliated with the growing neo-Nazi Skinhead prison 
gang Public Enemy Number One. The football coach is a convicted felon and has a prison tattoo of a swastika on his 
stomach below the letters S.W.P. for "Supreme White Power." He said the arsenal of rifles and handguns police 
found in his house were for hunting rabbits and coyotes. Prosecutors charged him with illegal possession of firearms 
anyway, perhaps swayed from leniency by the numerous photos also discovered at the coach's house. The pictures 
appeared to have been taken at a series of neo-Nazi rallies held at rural locations in Riverside County. In one, two 
12-year-old girls salute a swastika flag. 
Riverside County Sheriff Bob Doyle said the amount of white power literature seized from the coach's house is the 
most he's seen in three decades of law enforcement. 
"Hate groups such as these endanger lives," he said. "These types of people are trying to find a refuge here, and 
we're trying to stop it." 
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1 THE COURT: Ms. Tina Eileen Roberts, you stand before 
2 the Court this day for sentencing of the offense — on the 
3 offense of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, to which 
4 you have pled guilty. The Court has had the opportunity to read 
5 a very well prepared and very thorough and complete pre-sentence 
6 report. 
7 The salient facts that come to the Courts mind are 
8 these. First and foremost, that a young woman lost her life, 
9 and that your behavior before, during and after the taking of 
10 that life is indicative of evil intent at every step. 
11 The Court finds that you orchestrated the circumstances 
12 and the location for this young woman, who when she had realized 
13 that she had begun involvement in criminal conduct to which she 
14 did not want to wish to participate any longer and wished to go 
15 back to the standards and the truths and the values that she had 
16 been taught by her parents, you took part in and assisted in 
17 every step of the proceedings to stop that young woman on her 
18 journey back into the light. 
19 You assisted Mr. Brown in providing a location for 
20 Trisha Stubbs to be beaten. You encouraged the beating yourself, 
21 even if you did not participate in it. You allowed that to go 
22 forward in your home, and you created an atmosphere because of 
23 your involvement with this gang culture wherein those involved 
24 believed they were doing something that was a positive act rather 
2 5 than a negative one. 
-19-
1 Your actions strike at the very core of the purpose 
2 for this Court, which is to find truth. Trisha Stubbs was the 
3 carrier of truth* She gave truth to the officer that she spoke 
4 with, but you and your involvement and in the involvement of 
5 those others participating with you attempted to hide and destroy 
6 that truth from this courtroom where it needs to be shouted loud, 
7 I for without that truth our society and our civilization will not 
8 stand. We will instead fall into brutal chaos, and you actions 
9 stand only for that chaos. 
10 The aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh 
11 the mitigating circumstance. This Court is limited by the limits 
12 of law as to what punishment may be imposed, and I will meet 
13 those limits in every way possible. It is the judgment and 
14 order of the Court that restitution in the amount of $20,000 be 
15 ordered, and in no way does the Court attempt by that order to 
16 put a dollar value on the life of Trisha Stubbs. 
17 It is the order of the Court that a fine be imposed to 
18 the maximum allowable by law, and that fine is the amount of 
19 $18,525. It is the order of the Court that you serve a minimum 
20 mandatory term at the Utah State Prison of at least 15 years — 
21 at least 15 years. Because of the assault upon the justice 
22 system here in the State of Utah that this crime represents, it 
23 is this Court's strongest recommendation to the Utah Board of 
24 Pardons that you never see the light of day outside of prison 
25 again. 
-20-
You have 30 days to perfect an appeal from any error 
of the Court in any proceeding prior to today's date or in this 
proceeding by filing a written a notice of appeal with the clerk 
of the Court within that 30-day period of time. 
Mr. Filter, if you'll prepare the appropriate pleadings. 
MR. FILTER: I will, your Honor. Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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The above-captioned matter came before the Court for sentencing on July 12, 2006. 
Brian G. Filter, Deputy Washington County Attorney, represented the plaintiff, and the 
defendant, TINA EILEEN ROBERTS, was present and represented by her counsel, Brenda S. 
Whiteley. The defendant has previously entered a plea of guilty to AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPPING, a first degree felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information on file herein, and 
Count 2: Murder, a first degree felony, and Count 3: Obstruction of Justice, a third degree 
felony, were dismissed by the Court at the request of the State, in accordance with the terms of a 
plea agreement accepted by the Court on March 29, 2006. The Court requested and received a 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report from the Utah Department of Corrections. 
The Court heard the sentencing recommendations and arguments of counsel for the State 
and the defendant, and the defendant made a statement in her own behalf. The father of the 
victim in this matter also made a statement to the Court. 
The Court, having reviewed the files and records of this action, including the Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters 
the following Judgment, Restitution Judgment, Sentence, Recommendation, and Commitment: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HERE BY FOUND that the defendant, TINA EILEEN ROBERTS, is guilty of 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a first degree felony, in violation of Section 76-5-302, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. as amended, as charged in Court 1 of the Information. 
RESTITUTION JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, upon the Court's consideration of the statutory criteria, that 
pecuniary damages were incurred by the father of the victim in this matter as a result of 
defendant's actions, and the Department of Corrections has recommended that the defendant be 
required to pay restitution in the total amount of $20,000 to reimburse the victim's father for 
funeral expenses, which amount shall bear interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that restitution judgment is entered against the defendant and 
in favor of the father of victim in the total amount of $20,000, plus interest at the statutory rate 
until paid in full, as reimbursement for funeral expenses, said judgment to be the joint and 
several obligation of the defendant and her co-defendant Kyle Sheldon Jensen, the defendant in 
Criminal No. 061500066. 
2 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, TINA EILEEN ROBERTS, shall serve 
an indeterminate sentence of not less than fifteen (15) years and which may be for life in the 
Utah State Prison, and pay a fine and surcharge in the amount of $18,525.00, plus interest at the 
statutory rate until paid in full, for her conviction for AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a first 
degree felony. 
RECOMMENDATION 
IT IS THE COURT'S STRONGEST RECOMMENDATION that this defendant serve 
the remainder of her life in prison. 
COMMITMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, TINA EILEEN ROBERTS, shall be 
delivered to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, where she shall be kept and confined in 
accordance with the orders of this Court. 
Date: / >C \ U CA , 
' ~ JAMES L. SHUMAT^>District Court Judge 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, Carolyn Smitherman, Clerk of said District Court of Washington County, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable James L. Shumate, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the 
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Court 
on this date: 4MJI>IL / I M / . 
L
' CAROLYN SMITHERMAN 
Clerk of District Court 
By. Nnxairf 
Deputy Clerk , 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on *7 " I "7 — O k I placed a true and correct unsigned copy 
of the foregoing document, together with a copy of the related Restitution Judgment 
Information Statement and Sheriffs Return, in the inter-office folder of defendant's counsel, 
Brenda S. Whiteley, located at the Washington County Attorney's Office. 
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